VicARious EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY

SExuAL HARASSMENT: "SEE No EvIL, HEAR No EVIL" IS
No EXCUSE
Claims of sexual harassment' in the workplace are generally
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, in
part, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex.2 As
the number of sexual harassment complaints skyrockets,3 courtCatharine MacKinnon defines "sexual harassment" as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979). The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has provided the followin'g definition:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
Section 2000e-2, which defines unlawful employment practices, prohibits discrimination "against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (1). For a fascinating account of how "on the basis of sex" found its way into Title VII, see generally Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism
as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 163 (1991).
Courts have considered sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII as
discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955
F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that there is an inference of harassment based
on sex if the sexual behavior is directed at a woman); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254
(4th Cir. 1983) (stating that sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title VII if
condoned or carried out by a supervisor). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998)
(dictating that sexual harassment in the workplace is a violation of Title VII). But see
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 840 (1991) (noting that courts do
not always equate sexual behavior with discrimination on the basis of sex).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received 6,883 sexual harassment complaints in fiscal year 1991. See Mark Hansen, Love's Labor Laws, 84
A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (June 1998). A total of 15,589 such complaints were filed in fiscal
year 1997 (42-43 per day). See id. Damage awards in 1997 alone totaled 49.5 million
dollars. See id. Especially interesting in light of these astounding figures, sexual harassment in the workplace was deemed to have reached "epidemic" proportions as far
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rooms, boardrooms, and lunchrooms across the country are buzzing
with discussion and debate over topics ranging from human sexuality
and gender disparities4 to First Amendment rights. 5 In recent years,
the judiciary has attempted to grasp firmly what it once considered
beyond its reach. 6 Of particular concern has been employers' liability for sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.
Sexual harassment claims fall into two categories: quid pro quo
and hostile environment. 8 If a victim of sexual harassment can demonstrate that ajob detriment or benefit occurred as a result of his or
her reaction to an unwelcome sexual advance, that harassment is labeled quid pro quo. ' Hostile environment harassment, on the other
back as 1975, when the term "sexual harassment" was relatively unheard of. See Enid
Nemy, Women Begin to Speak Out Against Sexual Harassmentat Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1975, at 38 (quoting Lin Farley, director of the women's section of Cornell University's Human Affairs Program).
4 See PETER RUTTER, UNDERSTANDING & PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
31-54
(1996) (highlighting gender stereotypes and differences, both actual and perceived).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech ...." Id. Some commentators fear that sexual harassment law has a chilling
effect on free speech in the workplace:
To protect themselves from ruinous damages ...companies will face
increasing pressure to ensure that their policies are effective in preventing anything that might possibly provoke a complaint. This means
adopting something close to a zero-tolerance policy for sexual expression. And, in a society whose citizens spend most of their time at work,
free expression more generally will suffer.
Anti-Expressionism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 20 & 27, 1998, at 7.
See Estrich, supra note 2, at 821 n.24 (citing Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (intimating that
courts should refrain from hearing such cases, since sexual attraction is a natural
phenomenon); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557
(D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (postulating that consideration of
such actions would require "4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400")).
7 See generally Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for
"Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an
Appropriate Standard,25 U. MEM. L. REV. 667 (1995) (providing a circuit-by-circuit
anal sis of the various justifications for employer liability).
See Estrich, supra note 2, at 834-47 (detailing the differences between a quid
pro quo and hostile environment cause of action).
See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 900, 908-09 (11th Cir. 1982)
(finding quid pro quo harassment where a police dispatcher was prevented from attending police academy for refusing to have sexual relations with a supervisor).
Courts have explained, "'The gravamen of a quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job
benefit or privilege is conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual blackmail
and that adverse consequences follow from the employee's refusal."' Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Carrero v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Michelle Adams, Knowing
Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 17, 40 (1998)
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hand, is less direct.'0 For a claim of hostile environment harassment
to be actionable, the victim must demonstrate that the behavior was
unwelcome and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the victim's
employment conditions and create a working environment tainted
with abuse." Regardless of the characterization of a particular claim,
the United States Supreme Court has suggested that agency principles should
provide guidance to courts grappling with employer li12
ability.

Common law principles of agency incorporate the long-standing
doctrine of respondeat superior, which declares that an employer is
liable for the torts of his servants that are committed while acting
within the scope of employment." In cases involving quid pro quo
(defining quid pro quo sexual harassment); Estrich, supra note 2, at 831 ("The prototype fact pattern is simple: If you sleep with me, you'll be promoted; if you don't,
you'll be fired.").
10 See Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986).
1 See id. (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
12 See id. at
72.
13 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at
499-500 (5th ed. 1984). Proponents of respondeat superior justify the doctrine as
follows: Since the employer places the employee in the position to commit a wrong,
it is the employer, rather than the victim, who should bear the costs of that risk. See
Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed By Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1513,
1518-19 (1992).
An "agent" is someone "employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of service is controlled or subject to the
right of control by the master."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958).

Section 219 provides in full:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.
Id. § 219.
Section 228 defines "scope of employment" as the following:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another,
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harassment, the Court's suggestion has proven effective and results
have been consistent.'4 When a hostile environment is alleged, however, what was meant to clarify the issue has in practice served to confound. In situations in which terms and conditions of employment
have been affected by allegedly severe or pervasive sexual harassthe proper application
ment, courts have been unable to agree upon
15
of agency principles for imputing liability.
In the recent case of Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,16 the United
States Supreme Court confronted the conflicting application of
agency principles to cases of supervisory hostile environment harassment. 7 The Court concluded that an employer is vicariously liable
for hostile environment harassment perpetrated by a supervisor upon
an employee. 8 The Court clarified, however, that an employer may
have an affirmative defense to damages and liability if there is proof
the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time
or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. § 228.
14 Courts have had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that a
strict liability
approach is appropriate in cases of quid pro quo harassment. See Harrison v. Eddy
Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997) ("In cases involving quid pro quo
harassment, courts routinely hold, with little or no discussion, that the employer is
'strictly liable' for the supervisor's wrongful conduct."); see, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir. 1994); Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs.
Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1363 n.9 (11 th Cir. 1994). Since the supervisor in such cases acts
with actual or apparent authority to bestow job benefits or detriments upon the victim, it can be said, without pause, that the supervisor acts within the scope of his or
her employment, thereby implicating liability based upon the Restatement of
Agency. SeeREsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§§ 219(1), 219(2) (d) (1958).
Strict liability is ordinarily "[a] concept applied by the courts in product liability
cases in which seller is liable for any and all defective or hazardous products which
unduly threaten a consumer's personal safety." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th
ed. 1990).
15 Compare Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir.
1994)
(imposing liability upon an employer despite existence of an anti-harassment policy,
because the supervisor's hostile environment harassment was aided by the agency
relation) with Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (imputing no liability upon an employer; finding that the existence of an anti-harassment policy demonstrated that, despite the representations of the supervisor, the victim "knew or
should have known" that harassment was not tolerated and that no adverse consequences would have resulted from a report of the harassment). The Tenth Circuit
adopted the Karibian approach, holding an employer vicariously liable where a supervisor uses actual or apparent authority to facilitate the harassment, despite the
existence of a sexual harassment policy. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1446.
16 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
17 See id. at 2280. Faragherwas released alongside Burlington Industries, Inc.
v.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292. The holdings of these
companion cases are identical. See id.
See id. at 2292-93.
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of the employee's unreasonable failure to take advantage of existing,
reasonable methods of prevention and correction."'
Beth Ann Faragher worked as a lifeguard for the City of Boca
Raton, Florida, (City) from 1985 through 1990.20
Specifically,
Faragher was employed in the Parks and Recreation Department's
Marine Safety Section.2 Her immediate supervisors during this period were Bill Terry, who was Chief of the Marine Safety Division;
David Silverman, who was the Marine Safety Lieutenant from 1985
through 1989 and later Captain; and Robert Gordon, who held the
position of Training Captain. 22 Terry's duties included the hiring,
supervision, counseling, and disciplining of lifeguards, while Silverman and Gordon were responsible for the delegation of lifeguard assignments and the supervision of lifeguard training. 23
In 1986, the City drafted a memorandum that was addressed to
all city employees but was issued only to some.24 This memorandum,
which was revised and reissued in 1990, detailed the City's newly
adopted policy against sexual harassment. 25 The City, however, failed
to disseminate its policy properly.26 Accordingly, the lifeguards, as
1, See id. at 2293.

See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1997).
Faragher, then a college student, was employed by the city of Boca Raton (City) as
an ocean lifeguard. See id. She worked throughout the summer months and intermittently during the off-seasons. See id.
2
See id. The Marine Safety Headquarters was housed in a small, one-story building. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1994). Of
the 40 or 50 lifeguards employed during this period, only four to six of them were
female. See id. All of them, both men and women, shared a common shower and
locker room. See id.
See Faragher,118 S.Ct. at 2280.
23 See id.
The Marine Safety Section followed a strict chain of command. See
Faragher; 111 F.3d at 1533. Lifeguards such as Faragher were supervised by Marine
Safety Lieutenants. See id. Marine Safety Lieutenants, in turn, answered to captains,
who reported directly to the Chief of the Marine Safety Section. See id. The Chief of
the Marine Safety Section was supervised by a Recreation Superintendent, whose
authority was subordinate to the Director of Parks and Recreation and, ultimately,
City Hall. See id.
25 See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
20

25 See id. at 2280.
26 See id. at 2280-81.

The district court remarked, "Notwithstanding the existence
of a written policy against sexual harassment, the [c]ourt finds a complete failure on
the part of the City to disseminate said policy among Marine Safety Section employees." Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1560. This failure contravened the guidelines of the
EEOC:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harass-
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well as supervisors Terry, Silverman, and Gordon, were unaware of
the policy prior to this litigation. 7
During her five years of employment with the City, Faragher was
repeatedly subjected to unwanted touching on the shoulders, waist,
thighs, and buttocks by Marine Safety Chief Terry. 8 On a number of
occasions Terry spoke suggestively and coarsely to Faragher and
other female lifeguards.2 His behavior was mirrored by Captain Silverman, whose unwanted touching and crude discourse were welldocumented at trial.30 Faragher made no complaint to uppermanagement about the offensive behavior of her supervisors. While
she and her fellow lifeguards did have some informal discussions with
Gordon about the situation, Gordon chose not to make any official
reports of his own. 32 In 1990, Faragher left her job to attend law
school .
ment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (1998); see supra note 1.
27 See Faragher,118 S.
Ct. at 2280-81.
28 See id. at 2281.
Details of Terry's behavior toward Faragher and the other female lifeguards were articulated by a number of eye-witnesses at testimony. See
Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1556-57. One female lifeguard, Nancy Ewanchew, testified
that Terry had pressed his crotch against Ewanchew's buttocks, simulating sexual
movement. See id. at 1556. Ewanchew further stated that Terry had touched her
breast and buttocks with his hand. See id,at 1557. Other female lifeguards also testified that Terry had touched them against their will. See id.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2281. On one occasion, Terry told Ewanchew that
Faragher was "male-like" because "she had no breasts." Faragher,864 F. Supp. at
1557. He repeatedly referred to women as "bitches" and "cunts," and during an
employment interview he even asked a prospective lifeguard if she would "fuck" or
"screw" the male lifeguards once hired, as, according to Terry, the rest of the female
lifeguards did. See id.
See Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1557-58. At one point, Silverman tackled
Faragher and told her, "If you had tits I would do you in a minute." Id. at 1557. At
another time, Silverman pantomimed cunnilingus in the presence of Faragher and
Ewanchew. See id. His behavior toward the other female lifeguards was similar. See
id. For example, Silverman once told Ewanchew "[t]here are a lot of tits on the
beach today." Id. He told another lifeguard, Jamie Herrington, that he could see
her nipples through her bathing suit, and that he wanted to "eat between her legs."
See id. at 1558. In addition, Silverman told Gale Nye, "I want to lick your clit." Id.
This particular comment was directed at Ms. Nye during her first day of employment
as a lifeguard. See id. He also referred to her as a "cunt." See id.
31 SeeFaragher,118 S. Ct. at 2281.
52 See id
Gordon felt that a confrontation with Terry would be inappropriate
since Terry was his direct supervisor. See id,On one occasion, Gordon had told a
distressed lifeguard that "the City just [doesn't] care." Id. (alteration in original).
33 SeeFaragherv. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1997).
The
district court found that Faragher's resignation was unrelated to Terry's and Silverman's offensive behavior. See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1556. Curiously, when
Faragher's sister sought employment as a city lifeguard, Faragher made no effort to
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The City was unaware of Terry's and Silverman's misbehavior
until April 1990, when Nancy Ewanchew, Faragher's co-worker, complained of sexual harassment in a letter to the City's Director of Personnel.34 Upon investigation, the City found that Terry and Silverman had indeed conducted themselves improperly. 3
They were
subsequently disciplined and reprimanded."'
In 1992, two years after her resignation, Faragher brought suit
against the City, Terry, and Silverman in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. Following a bench trial,
the district court held the City directly liable for the sexual harassment perpetrated by Terry and Silverman.38 Having found that
Faragher stated a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment against Terry and Silverman, 9 the district court noted that
dissuade her. See id.
54 See Faragher,
111 F.3d at 1533.
35 See id.
36 See id. The City's disciplinary action
against Terry and Silverman consisted of
a choice: They could choose between forfeiture of annual leave, or suspension
without pay. See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1559. Terry ultimately chose a forfeiture
of 160 hours annual leave, while Silverman forfeited 40 hours annual leave. See id.
37 See Faragher, 11 F.3d at 1533. Faragher asserted claims
of sexual harassment
against the City in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. She
also asserted claims of sexual harassment against Terry and Silverman in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). See id. at 1533-34. Section 1983 states that any person who
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Faragher also brought a successful state claim for battery against
Terry and an unsuccessful state claim against the City for negligent retention and
supervision of Terry. See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1567-68.
See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1564.
39 See id. at 1561-64. The district court's finding was predicated
upon an analysis
of the five elements of hostile environment sexual harassment, which were set forth
in Henson:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group .... (2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment .... (3) The har-

assment complained of was based upon sex .... (4) The harassment
complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and (5) [r]espondeat superior.
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982).
The court had little difficulty in reaching a determination that the first three
elements had been met. See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1561. First, noted the court,
Faragher, as a female, falls within a protected group. See id. Next, the court found
the offensive nature of Terry's and Silverman's behavior to be dispositive of its unwelcomeness. See id.Finally, since Terry's and Silverman's behavior was directed
solely at female lifeguards and secretaries, the court proclaimed that the harassment
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the City could be held vicariously liable under a respondeat superior
analysis.40 Nonetheless, the court declared that such a finding would
be unnecessary, since the City was directly liable for the harassment
under principles of agency. 4' According to the court, Terry and Silverman's supervisory positions, coupled with the strictly delimited hierarchy of the Parks and Recreation Department, 42 suggested that
Terry and Silverman acted as agents of the City, hence the City could
be held liable for their harassing behavior.43 Finally, the court maintained that the City's failure properly to disseminate its policy against
sexual harassment robbed it of any potential defense."
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit found that, while Terry's and Silverman's behavior unquestionably constituted hostile environment sexual harassment, the City
could not be held directly or vicariously liable.45 According to the
panel, neither Terry nor Silverman was acting within the scope of his

was based on sex. See id.
The fourth element of the district court's hostile environment analysis was explored in more detail. See id. at 1562-64. Despite what the court referred to as
Faragher's "attenuated reaction to [the offensive] environment," the court ultimately found that the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of her employment were affected. Id. at 1562-64. The court held:
Terry's and Silverman's conduct unreasonably interfered with
Faragher's work performance by promoting an environment where
female lifeguards were considered fair game for uninvited touching
and offensive remarks ....
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, therefore, the [c]ourt finds Terry's and Silverman's conduct
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Faragher's
employment and create an abusive working environment ....
Id. at 1562-63.
40 See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1563-64; see also supra note 13
(explaining the doctrine of respondeat superior). To impute liability to an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "the employee 'must show that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action."' Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1563 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 905). If
the harassment in question reaches the level of "pervasiveness," an employer's
knowledge or constructive knowledge will be inferred. See id. The district court explained that, since Terry's and Silverman's harassment was pervasive, the City had
constructive knowledge, and could therefore be held vicariously liable. See id. at
1563.
41 See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1563-64; see also supra note
13 (setting forth the
Restatement's basic principles of vicarious employer liability).
42 See supranote 23.
43 See Faragher,864 F. Supp. at 1563-64. Furthermore, the
court held that Gordon's failure to act implicated the City as well, since he too was an agent. See id. at
1564.
See id. Faragher was ultimately awarded one dollar in damages. See Faragher
v.
City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1997).
5 SeeFaragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1162-66
(11th Cir. 1996).
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employment while harassing Faragher.4 6 The panel found that, since
Terry and Silverman were not aided by the agency relationship, 7 and
since the City had no constructive knowledge of their behavior, the
City could not be held liable. 8
The opinion of the circuit court was subsequently vacated and
reheard by the entire United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc.4 , The panel's conclusions were ultimately adopted by the full court in a seven-to-five decision. 50 Having
determined that Terry and Silverman acted outside the scope of their
employment, 5' without any explicit or implicit approval or authorization from the City,52 the court concluded that the district court's find-

See id. at 1166. According to the court, the harassment "consisted of offensive
comments, gestures, and touching. If... Terry and Silverman had constructed
something offensive and intimidating to women under the guise of trying to improve lifeguard performance, then their supervisory and disciplinary authority
would support a finding that they acted as the City's agents in violating Title VII."
Id.
47 See id. at 1166
n.14.
48 See id. at 1167 & n.16 (finding that Gordon was not an agent of the City
when
he was told of the harassment, since the lifeguards confided in him as a colleague,
not a superior).
49 See Faragher,111 F.3d at 1534; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
526-27 (6th ed.
1990) ("In the United States, the Circuit Courts of Appeal usually sit in panels of
judges but for important cases may expand the bench to a larger number, when they
are said to be sitting en banc.").
50
See Faragher,111 F.3d at 1539. Heeding Meritor's advice, the court relied on
the Restatement of Agency to hold that
an employer may be indirectly liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment by a superior: (1) if the harassment occurs within the
scope of the superior's employment; (2) if the employer assigns performance of a non-delegable duty to a supervisor and an employee is
injured because of the supervisor's failure to carry out that duty; or (3)
if there is an agency relationship which aids the supervisor's ability or
opportunity to harass his subordinate.
Id. at 1535 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§ 219 (1958)).
51 See Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1536 (citing Bennett v. United States,
102 F.3d 486,
489 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that agent is not acting within scope of employment if
action is taken to seek a personal, rather than an employment-related, end);
Spencer v. Assurance Co. of Am., 39 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that
an agent is not acting within scope of employment when pursuing an independent
frolic)).
52 See id. at 1537.
The court recognized that supervisory hostile environment
sexual harassment may always be aided by the agency relationship because the supervisor's responsibilities place him or her in close proximity to the victim. See id.
(citing Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011
(1995)). The court chose not to adopt so broad a view, however, and found that
Terry and Silverman were not aided by an agency relationship since they never
threatened Faragher with job-related action in retaliation for her response to their
harassing behavior. See id
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ing of vicarious liability against the City was wholly inappropriate. 3
Furthermore, the court proclaimed that the City could not be held
directly
liable since it lacked constructive knowledge of the harass54
ment.

Recognizing the need to set manageable standards for determining employer liability for supervisory hostile environment sexual harassment, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 55 justice Souter, writing for the majority, opined that a harassing
supervisor is necessarily aided by an agency relationship, despite the
fact that the victim in such circumstances is almost never expressly
reminded of the supervisor's authority. 56 The Court noted that an
employer is in the best position to train and screen supervisors.
Therefore, the Court reasoned that an innocent employer, rather
than an innocent employee, should bear the risk. 58 As long as the Victim has not suffered any tangible job detriment, the Court declared,
the employer may have an affirmative defense to

liability.5 9

This de-

fense, the Court explained, would require proof by a preponderance
of the evidence that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer's existing reasonable methods of prevention or
correction. 60
The origins of hostile environment sexual harassment jurisprudence can be traced to 1971, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 6 ' That case, although analyzing Title VII in the
context of racial discrimination, laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's development of hostile environment sexual harassment theory.62 The court held that an employee may have a cause of
53 See id.

54 See id. at 1538-39.
The majority disagreed with the district court's conclusion
that the pervasiveness of the harassment was indicative of the City's constructive notice. See id. at 1538 ("The question of notice to the employer is distinct from the
question of the environment's abusiveness."). The court felt that the facts of this
case could not support an inference of the City's constructive notice. See id. at 1539.
55 SeeFaragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 438 (1997).
SeeFaragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2291 (1998).
57 See id.
58 See
id.
59 See id. at 2292.
60 See id.
61 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).

62 See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXuAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT

45 (1992). In Rogers, the plaintiff, who worked in an optometrist's office, complained of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236. She claimed that her employer allowed her only to
treat patients of Spanish descent. See id
LAW
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action under Title VII where the employer created an offensive work
environment even in the absence of a tangible job detriment. 6 The
court underscored the significance of an employee's relationship
with his or her working environment 6 and acknowledged that a
working environment charged with discrimination can be damaging
to an employee's psychological well-being!" This recognition, coupled with a broad interpretation of Title VII, led the Fifth Circuit
to
66
sanction claims of environmental harassment in the workplace.
Although Rogers would ultimately have a significant impact on
the development of sexual harassment law, sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination under Title VII was not recognized by the
judiciary until 1976, five years later, in Williams v. Saxbe 7 In Williams,
Judge Charles R. Richey held that a male supervisor's retaliatory actions against a female employee who rejected the supervisor's sexual
advances constituted a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.68 Noting that Congress intended Title VII to be construed
See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 ("[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges
of
employment' . . . is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination.").
(A
See id. at 237-38.
See id. at 238. ("One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority group workers, and I think [slection 703 of Title VII was aimed
at the eradication of such noxious practices.").
CA'See id. at 238-39. For an additional example of the application of Rogers' principle of harassment, see Firefighters Institutefor Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549
F.2d 506, 515 (8th Cir. 1977), which determined that the failure to promote a black
individual to fire captain was not the result of racial discrimination. See also Cariddi
v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (illustrating
hostile environment analysis as applied to national origin); Compston v. Borden,
Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (illustrating hostile environment analysis in context of harassment based on religion).
67 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). Williams involved the accusations of Diane R.
Williams, employee of the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice, against her immediate supervisor, Harvey Brinson. See id. at 655. Brinson
maintained that Williams had been terminated because of her poor work performance, while Williams argued that she had been fired for refusing Brinson's sexual
advances. See id. at 655-56.
68
See id. at 657. Prior to Williams, courts had been extremely hesitant to equate
quid pro quo sexual harassment with discrimination on the basis of sex, and stated a
number of reasons for their hesitancy: (1) sexual harassment is of an inherently
personal nature; (2) it is based upon attractiveness of the victim, rather than her
gender; and (3) it falls outside the realm of employment-related conduct. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an employer is not liable for simple flirtations; Title VII is not meant to cover such "isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct.");
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on pro-
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broadly,6 the court found that the supervisor's conduct created an
obstacle to employment for women and not for men. 7 The court
concluded that any such obstacle, applied solely on the basis of gender, was actionable under Title VII. 71 Williams marked a significant
departure from the judiciary's general hesitancy to equate sexual
harassment with gender discrimination.
One decade after Williams, the United States Supreme Court
significantly broadened the scope of actionable sexual harassment in
the workplace by extending the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Rogers to
discrimination on the basis of sex.7 3 In Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v.
Vinson,74 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, recognized that
unwelcome sexual behavior 75 that is so severe or pervasive as to alter
the terms and conditions of employment violates the dictates of Title
VII. 7

The Court found that Title VII was not drafted by Congress

cedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that sexual harassment is a conflict between individual personalities, not gender discrimination); Barnes v. Train,
No. 1828-73, 1974 WL 10628, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974) (determining that harassment was based upon employee's refusal to sleep with her supervisor, not the employee's gender), rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Furthermore, courts harbored a fear that such a finding would subject the judiciary
to an overwhelming amount of litigation. See Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236 (warning
that if such harassment is to be characterized as gender discrimination, "flirtations of
the smallest order would give rise to liability"); see generally BARBARA LINDEMANN &
DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 10-13 (1992).
See Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co.,
482 F.2d 535, 537 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973)).
70 See id. at 657-58.
71 See id. at 658 ("That a rule, regulation, practice, or policy is applied
on the basis of gender is alone sufficient for a finding of sex discrimination.").
7
See supra note 68. The fact pattern in Williams epitomizes what the courts
would come to recognize as "quid pro quo" harassment - termination, demotion,
or promotion in response to an employee's acceptance or rejection of an employer's
sexual advances. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73 See Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 66
(1986). "[Rogers]
was apparently the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work environment .... Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment
based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited." Id.
74 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
75 "The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were '[u]nwelcome."' Id. at 68 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
76 See id. at 65-67. Meritor considered the allegations of Mechelle
Vinson, an employee of Meritor Savings Bank, who testified to having sexual intercourse with her
manager, Sidney Taylor, forty to fifty times over a period of several years. See id. at
60. Vinson claimed that she complied with her manager's sexual requests for fear of
losing her job. See id. According to Vinson, Taylor had raped her on several occasions. See id. Vinson testified that she did not report the harassment to Taylor's supervisor because she feared Taylor's possible reactions. See id at 61. Taylor denied
all of the allegations, claiming that he neither requested nor received sexual favors
from Vinson and never even made a single suggestive remark. See id. The district
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solely with economic and tangible discrimination in mind, but rather
with the intent to obviate all permutations of discrimination, economic or otherwise." Justice Rehnquist remarked that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Guidelines (Guidelines) do not consider
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature to constitute prohibited sexual harassment only in quid pro quo circumstances; such behavior,
according to the Guidelines, also amounts to sexual harassment in
situations in which the conduct unreasonably interferes with work
performance or creates an offensive or hostile work environment.7
Hence, the Court added "hostile environment" sexual harassment to
the catalogue of prohibited discriminatory employment practices
under Title VII.7 While declining to issue a determinative rule for
imputing employer liability in such situations, the Court suggested
that agency principles should be consulted for guidance. °
court denied relief, finding that, even if Vinson and Taylor had sexual intercourse,
the activity was purely voluntary and precipitated no tangible job benefit or detriment. See Vinson v. Taylor, No. CIV.A.78-1793, 1980 WL 100, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,
1980). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, finding that hostile environment harassment, even in the absence of an employment benefit or detriment, could give rise to liability under Title VII. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141,
145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Guided by principles of agency, the District of Columbia
Circuit found that an employer is absolutely liable for supervisory harassment
whether or not the employer knew or should have known of the offensive behavior.
See id. at 151.
77 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The Court explained, "The phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Id.
(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
78 See id. at 65. According to the Guidelines,
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when ... (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
7
See Meritor,477 U.S. at 73.
84 See id. at 72. The Court rejected the court of appeals' proposal that employers
are automatically liable for hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by
supervisory employees. See id. Since Congress defined "'employer' to include any
'agent' of the employer," the Court concluded that Congress contemplated limits
upon those acts, committed by employees, for which employers are to be held liable
under Title VII. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994)). The Court refused
"to entirely disregard agency principles and impose absolute liability on employers
for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular case."
Id. at 73. The Court's opinion suggests that, had the issue of liability been directly
before it, it may have adopted a requirement of constructive or actual knowledge on
the part of the employer for liability to attach. See Lucy B. Longstreth, Note, Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment: A Wrong Without a Remedy? - Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 21 SUFFOLKU. L. REv. 811, 823 (1986).
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While Meritorrecognized hostile environment sexual harassment
as actionable under Title VII, the circuit courts were in conflict over
the proper requirements for finding that a work environment had
reached the actionable stage."' In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,8 the
United States Supreme Court examined whether or not an employer's conduct, to be actionable, must harm an employee's psychological well-being or cause the employee to suffer injury.
The
unanimous Court, in an opinion penned by Justice O'Connor, held
that, while conduct that would cause a reasonable person psychological injury is certainly prohibited under Title VII, a plaintiff need not
demonstrate such an injury to bring a successful cause of action.'"
Psychological injury, according to the Court, is but one of several factors that ajury may consider when evaluating a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment."" The Court announced that, as long as
the victim subjectively perceives the work environment to be hostile
or abusive and, provided that an objective, reasonable person would
find the conduct to be severe or pervasive, a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment may be successful on the merits. 86
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,87 the United States
Supreme Court expanded the potential pool of sexual harassment
plaintiffs, holding that Title VII applies to same-sex sexual harassment. 88 The Court refused to adhere to the notion that members of a
81 The circuit courts of appeal applied Meritor's "severe or pervasive" test incon-

sistently. Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
(requiring a serious effect on employee's psychological well-being) with Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting damaged psychological wellbeing requirement, adopting a "reasonable woman" standard for finding harassment
actionable).
82 510 U.S. 17 (1993). The petitioner, Theresa Harris, alleged that her
employer's use of gender-based insults constituted an abusive work environment. See id.
at 19. Harris testified that her employer, who was the company president, made
comments such as "You're a woman, what do you know .... We need a man as the
rental manager." Id. According to Harris, her employer referred to her as a "dumb
ass woman" and made several inappropriate sexual innuendoes. See id.
83 See id. at 20.
84 See id. at 22 ("Title VII comes into play before
the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown.").
85 See id. at 23. Factors to weigh include the severity
of the behavior, its frequency, whether it is humiliating or threatening in nature, whether it creates an unreasonable interference with work performance, or whether the behavior consists of
a "mere offensive utterance." See id.
86 See id. at 21.
87 118 S. Ct. 998
(1998).
8 See id. at 1001-02. Joseph Oncale was employed by Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc. on an oil platform. See id. at 1000. Oncale claimed to have been sexually
harassed by members of his eight-man crew. See id. at 1001. Specifically, Oncale al-
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particular group will not discriminate against, members of their own
group.89 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stressed that the decision does not interpret Title VII as a general civility code and reiterated that harassment because of sex is still the determinative factor
for a successful claim., The Court repeated the objective reasonable
person standards that were articulated in Harris91 and appealed to the
common sense and sensitivities of the fact finders who must ultimately distinguish 9between
innocent teasing and hostile environment
2
sexual harassment.

In the few cases in which the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to define actionable sexual harassment,9 the Court has only
hinted at a governing standard for imputing employer liability for

leged that one of his co-workers, Danny Pippen, restrained him while John Lyons,
Oncale's supervisor, placed his penis on Oncale's neck, and, on another occasion,
placed his penis on Oncale's arm. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83
F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996). Oncale claimed to be threatened with homosexual
rape, and testified that, on one occasion, Pippen held him down in the shower while
Lyons forcibly inserted a bar of soap into Oncale's anus. See id. at 118-19.
89 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. The Court likened same-sex
sexual harassment
to same-race discrimination, which was addressed in Castaneda. See id (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)). The Court reminded, "'Because of the
many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law
that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of that group."' Id. (quoting Castaneda,430 U.S. at 499).
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted that courts have had little difficulty in
adhering to this principle where employees suffered a tangible job detriment. See id.
at 1002; see alsoJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (finding
that, where a female employee received a promotion and a male employee did not,
the fact that the employer was male had no effect on a claim of gender discrimination). Where hostile environment sexual harassment is alleged, however, the Justice
underscored a variety of conflicting approaches that federal courts have adopted.
See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002. Compare Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120 (holding that same-sex
sexual harassment is never actionable) with McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable where the harassing employer is homosexual, since sexual
desire can be inferred) and Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 144
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the harassment is actionable where the harasser is homosexual). See also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating that all workplace harassment that is sexual in nature is actionable, regardless of harasser's motivations, sex, or sexual orientation).
90 See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002. The Court reminded, "'The critical issue,
Title
VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.'" Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg,J., concurring)).
91 See supra note 82 and accompanying
text.
See Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1003.
93 The Court had considered workplace sexual harassment in only three
major
cases: Meritor,Harris, and Oncale. See supra notes 73-80, 82-86, 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing these major cases).
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harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.9 4 In 1998, the
Court was given an opportunity to focus its attention on this highly
unsettled area of sexual harassment jurisprudence in Faragherv. City
of Boca Raton9' In a seven-to-two opinion, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisory employer. 96 An employer, added the Court, may successfully defend against liability by proving that the allegedly harassed
employee failed to take advantage of reasonable methods of prevention and correction. 97
Cognizant of the circuit courts' inability to agree upon a uniform application of agency principles in this area,98 Justice Souter,
writing for the majority," commenced the opinion with a brief history of sexual harassment jurisprudence that traced the development
of the current hostile environment standard. 00 The Justice noted,
however, that, while the Court has had ample opportunity to delineate the substantive contours of sexual harassment, neither it nor the
lower courts have had occasion to rule definitively upon standards for
employer liability.'0 ' Justice Souter referenced a number of cases, for
example, in which an employer who knew or should have known of
the harassment, and did nothing, was held liable.0 2 In such cases, the
94
See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (suggesting a
consideration of agency principles for imputing liability to employers).
95 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
96 See id. at 2292-93.
97
See id. at 2293.
98 See id. at 2282; see also supra note 15 (citing examples of conflicting
circuit approaches).
99 See Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2279. Justice Souter's opinion
was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
See id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, authored a dissenting opinion. See
id.
10oSee id. at 2282-83. Citing Harrisand Oncale, the Court first acknowledged that
Title VII was not solely meant to protect against tangible or economic discrimination
and that "it covers more than '"terms" and "conditions" in the narrow contractual
sense."' Id. at 2283 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct.
998, 1001 (1998). Justice Souter related the early Title VII race cases to the development of the "severe or pervasive" hostile environment sexual harassment standard
announced in Meritorand stressed that the current standard should sufficiently weed
out litigation over simple teasing and horseplay. See id.
101See id. at 2284 ("[I] t is not surprising that in many of [our cases], the issue has
been joined over the sufficiency of the abusive conditions, not the standards for determining an employer's liability for them.").
102 See id. The Court cited the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Katz v. Dole, in which a
female air traffic controller informed her supervisor that her co-workers had been
sexually harassing her, only to be answered with actionable harassment by the supervisor himself. See id. (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 (4th Cir. 1983)). The
Fourth Circuit held that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) knew or should
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Court stated, liability has been imputed with ease, for the employer's
inaction can be seen as demonstrable negligence or as an affirmative
authorization of the offensive conduct.'0 3 Similarly, Justice Souter
noted that courts have frequently held employers liable in cases such
04 in which
as Harris'
the offending party enjoys a position of relative
power within the business organization.'0 5 The high-level position of
such an offender, the Court posited, has led courts to find an inference of agency authority and employer approval.'0 6 Finally, Justice
Souter remarked upon the seemingly unanimous findings of employer liability in quid pro quo situations wherein the supervisor's
sexual harassment has resulted in tangible job action.10 7 The Justice
noted several theories that courts have applied in reaching this conclusion: 0 8 (a) The supervisor actually "merges" with the employer
when such decisions are made,'0 9 (b) The supervisor who imposes a
have known of the harassment because of its severity and because the plaintiff specifically complained to her supervisor. See Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. The FAA's policy
against sexual harassment, according to the panel, could not shield it from liability
because of the FAA's "unmistakable acquiescence in or approval of the harassment .... ." Id'; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hacienda Hotel,
881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding an employer liable for management's
failure to respond to an employee's complaints of supervisory sexual harassment);
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[A]n employer
who has reason to know that one of his employees is being harassed... on grounds
of race, sex, religion, or national origin, and does nothing about it, is blamewor-

thy .).
03
104
105

106

See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2284.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing Harris in detail).
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2284.
See id. (citing Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting

that liability may be imputed to an employer where the supervisor holds a "high
level in the management hierarchy")). Courts have been unable to agree upon the
point at which an employee's position within the business hierarchy is "high"
enough to warrant a finding of employer liability. See, e.g., Torres, 116 F.3d at 634
(determining that an employer was not liable despite the fact that the offending supervisor was the highest ranking official at the employment site in question);
Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding no constructive notice although the harassing supervisor occupied the
highest level at his employment site, because of the site's distance from headquarters).
107 See Faragher,118 S.Ct. at 2284
(citing Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) ("[C]ourts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the
employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor's actions.")).
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2285.
1
See id. (citing Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62 (noting that the victimized employee does
not differentiate between the supervisor and employer); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that a supervisor necessarily acts as the company when sexual favors are requested in exchange for job
benefits)).
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tangible job detriment upon the employee in such situations naturally does so within the scope of his authority, 1 (c) The supervisor's
actions are aided by the agency relation,"' and (d) The supervisor is
acting2 within the scope of authority and is aided by the agency rela-

tion."1

Next, the Court discussed Meritor, the only case in which it had
touched upon standards of employer liability for sexual harassment. ' 3 In Meritor, the Court recounted, agency principles were
deemed to be relevant in an analysis of employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment." 4 The Court noted Meritos observation that,
while the existence of employee grievance procedures and employer
notice of the harassment are relevant to a liability analysis, they are
not dispositive in imputing liability to the employer." 5 In addition,
Justice Souter acknowledged Meritor's determination that Title VII
places limits upon employer liability for hostile environment harass-

110

SeeFaragher,118 S. Ct. at 2285 (citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405

(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a supervisor who fires an employee is authorized to do
just that - his wrongful intent does not bring the behavior "beyond the orbit of his
responsibilities as to excuse the employer") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY§ 228 (1958))).
I See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that a
harassing supervisor who fires an employee has the actual or apparent authority to do so).
See supra note 13 (setting forth the Restatement's basic principles of vicarious emplorer liability).
See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("Because the supervisor is acting within at least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by
the employer when he makes employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of his authority.") (emphasis added).
113 SeeFaragher,118 S. Ct. at 2285.
114

See id (citing Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)); see

also supranotes 74-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Meritordecision).
115
See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2285 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72). The Meritor
Court explained, "[A]bsence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate
that employer from liability." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (citation omitted)). In Meritor,
the Court stated:
[W]e reject petitioner's view that the mere existence of a grievance
procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent's failure to invoke that procedure, must insulate petitioner from
liability. While those facts are plainly relevant, the situation before us
demonstrates why they are not necessarily dispositive.
Id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Meritor, explained that the policy in
question was inadequate because it did not specifically address sexual harassment.
See id, Moreover, the Justice noted the ineffectiveness of a grievance procedure that
would require a victim to complain first to her direct supervisor - in this case, the
perpetrator of the sexual harassment. See id. at 73.
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ment and that employers, as a result, cannot automatically be held
liable for supervisory sexual harassment."6
The Court asserted its reliance upon Meritor as a foundation for
its forthcoming analysis." 7 The majority remarked that, due to the
principle of stare decisis,"8 Meritorwould receive great deference, especially in light of the fact that Congress left Menitor intact when it
expanded the liability provisions of Title VII in 1991."9 With this in
mind, the Court proceeded to speculate upon the advantages and
disadvantages of the three approaches to employer liability that were
scope of employment,
considered by the Eleventh Circuit below:
20
negligence.
and
agency,
law
common
Justice Souter began an analysis of the scope of employment
theory by recounting that courts of appeals have been overwhelmingly hesitant to place hostile environment sexual harassment within
the scope of a supervisor's employment.12 ' This hesitancy, Justice

17

See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2285.
See id. at 2286.

11
Stare decisis is the "[d]octrine that, when court has once laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether
the parties and property are the same." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990)
(citing Horne v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)). For a
more thorough treatment of the Court's modern applications of stare decisis, see
generally Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme CourtJurisprudence?: A CriticalAnalysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767 (1996).
118 See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2286. The Court remarked:
The decision of Congress to leave Meritor intact is conspicuous. We
thus have to assume that in expanding employers' potential liability
under Title VII, Congress relied on our statements in Meritor about the
limits of employer liability. To disregard those statements now (even if
we were convinced of reasons for doing so) would be not only to disregard stare decisis in statutory interpretation, but to substitute our revised judgment about the proper allocation of the costs of harassment
for Congress's considered decision on the subject.
Id. at 2291 n.4. The Court made note of the presumption that Congress, when
adopting rules that comport with judicial pronouncements, legislates with an awareness of those pronouncements. See id. at 2286 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States,
508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993)).
The amendments enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the relief
available under Title VII to include both compensatory and punitive damages. See
id. at 2291 n.4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)).
120 See id. at 2286.
1
See id. Justice Souter provided an extensive list of cases in which courts found
the harassment to fall outside of the supervisor's scope of employment. See id.
(citing Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997); Andrade
v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d
1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). An employer may nevertheless be liable for harassing
conduct that falls outside of the scope of employment if the supervisor's purpose is
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Souter stated, is attributable to determinations by various courts that
sexually offensive behavior is motivated by individual desires rather
than a wish to further some employment-related objective. 2 2 As such,
the Court averred, employers would not be held vicariously liable for
what was viewed as simple "frolic and detour.' ' 2 3 The Justice mentioned, however, that courts have construed the term "scope of employment" liberally in cases that fall outside of Title VII, holding employers liable for employee behavior which, at first glance, would not
The
seem to comport with employment-related expectations.'2 4
to "effectuate the employer's overall policy of discrimination, even if the method
chosen by the supervisor - sexual harassment - [falls] outside the scope of the suBARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISpervisor's duties."
CRIMINATION LAW 812 (3d ed. 1996).
1
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2286-87. Several earlier decisions provide evidence
of the judiciary's characterization of sexual supervisory misconduct as outside of the
scope of employment:
[The perpetrator]'s conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism. By his alleged sexual advances, [he] was satisfying a personal urge. Certainly no employer policy is here involved; rather than the company being benefited in any
way by the conduct... it is obvious it can only be damaged by the very
nature of the acts complained of.
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also supra note 68 (detailing reasons
for the judiciary's hesitancy to hold sexual harassment within the scope of a supervisor's employment).
1
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2287. The terms "frolic" and "detour" were first used
in a scope of employment context by Baron Parke, in Joel v. Morison. See Joel v. Morison, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338, 1338-39 (1834). Baron Parke stated, "If the servants, being
on their master's business, took a detour to call upon a friend, the master will be responsible ....but if he was going on a frolic of his own ....the master will not be

liable." Id.
14 See Faragher,118 S.Ct. 2287. The Court discussed Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, in which the Second Circuit held the government vicariously liable for
the actions of an inebriated sailor who, in his drunken state, flooded a ship and a
drydock. See id. (citing Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 168,
172 (2d Cir. 1968)). Judge Friendly, writing for a unanimous panel, acknowledged
that the sailor did not act to further his employer's purpose but held the government liable nonetheless, relying upon the "deeply rooted sentiment that a business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said
to be

characteristic

of its

activities ....[The

sailor]'s

conduct was

not

so

'unforeseeable' as to make it unfair to charge the [g]overnment with responsibility."
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 398 F.2d at 171.
Justice Souter also noted several other cases in which courts have construed
scope of employment liberally. See Faragher,118 S.Ct. at 2287 (citing Leonbruno v.
Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 711 (N.Y. 1920) (holding the employer liable for
injury caused when one employee threw an apple at another); Primeaux v. United
States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1462-63 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the case of a police officer
who sexually assaulted a motorist); Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(discussing the case of a furniture deliveryman who raped a customer)). The Lyon
court opined that the employer should be held liable where "the assault, sexual or
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Court chose not to attempt to reconcile the varied and inconsistent
results among the courts, recognizing 2that
any discord below was a
5
result of uneven judicial interpretation.
Whether an action is within the scope of employment, the Court
explained, depends upon a determination of the propriety of holding an employer responsible for the acts of a subordinate.YIN The
Court lamented
that the phrase "scope of employment" provides lit•
1 27
tle guidance, and, thus, it undertook to determine whether an employer, when confronted with supervisory hostile
environment sexual
28
harassment, should rightly bear the risk of loss.1

The Court voiced possible justifications for holding an employer
liable.'2 The Court determined that, since the employer is in a position to hire and train supervisors, and since the employer ultimately
receives the benefit of that investment of time and trust, the employer may rightfully sustain liability for a supervisor's objectionable
conduct.30 The Court explicated the concept that the paramount influence that an employer commands over the development of supervisors, coupled with the increasing awareness of sexual harassment in

otherwise, was triggered off or motivated or occasioned by a dispute over the conduct then and there of the employer's business ... [rather than solely by] propinquity and lust ... " Lyon, 533 F.2d at 655.
11 See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2287.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 2287-88 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OFTORTS § 69, at 502 (5th ed. 1984)). According to Prosser and Keeton:
This highly indefinite phrase... is so devoid of meaning in itself that
its very vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of
flexibility in decisions. It is obviously no more than a bare formula to
cover the unordered and unauthorized acts of the servant for which it
is found to be expedient to charge the master with liability, as well as
to exclude other acts for which it is not.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 69, at 502.
128 See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2288. The Restatement advises courts
to determine
"whether or not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant's acts should be
considered as one of the normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is employed."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a
(1958)).
129 See id. at 2288.
130 See id. The majority praised the dissent's justification in the court below:
"[A] pervasively hostile work environment of sexual harassment is
never (one would hope) authorized, but the supervisor is clearly
charged with maintaining a productive, safe work environment. The
supervisor directs and controls the conduct of the employees, and the
manner of doing so may inure to the employer's benefit or detriment,
including subjecting the employer to Title VII liability."
Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997)
(BarkettJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part)) (alteration in original).
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the workplace, 3 might provide a compelling justification for the imposition of liability. 3 2 It would not be unreasonable, the Court submitted, for an employer to anticipate incidents of harassment in the
workplace. 3 3 Nor would it be illogical, the Court stated, to hold an
employer liable for what might be viewed as an ordinary cost of doing business rather than rest the burden and expense of harassment
upon an unwitting victim.'M
Despite these justifications for holding employers liable for supervisory sexual harassment, the Court considered two arguments
that might counsel against such a holding: the possible impropriety
of disregarding scope of employment analysis, and the possible application of a negligence standard, an approach that had been
broadly embraced by district and circuit courts. 35 Justice Souter
forewarned that Congress had never advocated an abandonment of
the distinction between acts falling within the scope of the supervisor's employment and those falling without. 3" The Justice noted that
the task of drawing this distinction is not impossible in cases of sexual
harassment. 3 7 For example, the majority postulated, a supervisor
might be working within the scope of employment if he treats the
poor work performance of males with simple criticism while the
shortcomings of female employees are greeted with overt vulgarity.'
The Court suggested, on the other hand, that when a supervisor
makes unwelcome sexual advances toward an employee, it is clear
that the supervisor is acting to placate his own sexual appetite, not to
bestow any employment-related benefit upon his employer. 39 Since
the distinction is observable, the Court stated that an adherence to
traditional agency principles would be a sensible approach. 4 °
131

See id. at 2288; see also supra note 3 (setting forth statistics for sexual
harass-

ment complaints and damage awards).
12 See Faragher,118
S. Ct. at 2288.

See id.
See id.
135 See id.
at 2288-89.
13 See id. at 2288.
133
134

See id.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2289. The Court cited another example of a discriminatory practice prohibited by Title VII that would fall within the scope of a supervisor's employment. See id. at 2288-89. The Court explained that, where a supervisor discriminates on the basis of race in order to remedy a perceived workplace
racial imbalance, the supervisor is acting for the benefit of the employer; hence, the
supervisor is acting within the scope of his employment. See id
as9See id. at 2289.
140 See id.
("[1]t thus makes sense in terms of traditional agency law to analyze the
scope issue... just as most federal courts addressing that issue have done, classifying
the harassment as beyond the scope of employment.").
'7

138
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The Court next suggested that the application of a negligence
standard might also serve as an acceptable gauge of employer culpability.' " ' Under a negligence standard, the Court explained, the employer would be held liable if he or she knew or should have known
of the harassment and failed to rectify the situation. 42 The majority
noted that courts of appeals and district courts have consistently used
negligence standards to place harassment beyond the assigned duties
of common employees.1 43 This approach, the Court opined, has invariably shielded employers from liability absent a finding
that the
4
employer knew or should have known of the harassment.1
The majority recognized that automatically holding sexual harassment to be within the scope of supervisory employment would
render the negligence approach obsolete.' Furthermore, noted the
majority, automatic liability could logically extend from the tortious
acts of common employees, since employers benefit from the productivity of common employees no less than from that of supervisors.'4 The Court criticized this suggestion, however, charging that it

implicates basic principles of agency: Supervisors possess an authority that common employees lack and, thus, agency analysis is triggered. 41 7 With these principles in mind, the Court held that misuse of
supervisory authority,
without more, has no place in scope of em48
ployment analysis.

Next, the Court turned to section 219(2) (d) of the Restatement
of Agency, which provides that an employer may be liable for the
See id.
See id.
143 See id. at 2289. The Court cited an extensive
list of courts of appeals that have
applied negligence standards in the context of workplace harassment. See id. (citing
Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872-73 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998); Fleming v. Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242, 246 (11th Cir.
1997); Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997)).
1
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2289. The traditional elements in a negligence
cause
of action are as follows: (1) a legally recognized duty for a person to conform to a
certain standard of care; (2) failure on that person's part to conform to that standard, which constitutes "breach;" (3) causal connection between the breach and the
subsequent injury, and; (4) actual damage or loss. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 30, at 164-65.
141
142

145

See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2289.

See id. Common employees and supervisors, noted the Justice, "simply have
differentjobs to do." Id.
147 See id. at 2289-90. This notion stems logically from
the express language of
section 219(2) (d) of the Restatement: A master is not responsible for the torts of his
servant unless "the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(2) (d) (1958).
146

14

See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2290.
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torts of its servant if "'the servant purported to act or [to] speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.""49 The majority rejected the City's contention that
the aided-by-agency portion of section 219(2) (d) merely refines the
part that holds a principal liable for reliance upon apparent authority.'50 The Court charged that such a reading would render the second qualification superfluous and proceeded to expound upon the
merits of holding an employer5 liable in the absence of a supervisor's
affirmative claim of authority.1'
The Court found persuasive several factors in determining that a52
harassing supervisor is always aided by the agency relationship.
First, the Court validated Faragher's contention that a supervisor has
the benefit of a captive audience, since a supervisor has the authority
to demand attention and prohibit retreat. 15 Second, the Court acknowledged that a victim will be hesitant to report or resist the supervisor's advances for fear of retaliatory job action, whereas a victim
may generally respond to harassment from a common co-worker
without such apprehension. 154 Recognizing that an employer is
uniquely capable of monitoring and training supervisors, the Court
concluded that the aided-by-agency portion of section 219(2) (d)

219(2) (d) (1958)).

-

149

Id. (quoting

50

See id. Respondents, in their brief to the Court, stated:
Petitioner's reliance on this text ignores the common-law principles

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§

that underlie and give it meaning. It invites error to pluck a sentence

fragment from the Restatement and apply it as if it were a statute,
separate and apart from the legal background that the statement is in-

tended to synthesize.
Brief for Respondent at 31, Faragher(No. 97-282). Respondents argued that the
"second clause is simply a refinement of the 'apparent authority' doctrine articulated in the first clause of [s]ection 219(2)(d), which ... is a theory of liability primarily applicable to tortious acts that appear normal on their face - generally torts
of misrepresentation." Id. at 31 n.24.
151 See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2290. TheJustice buttressed
this argument by noting
examples of torts which, according to the commentary accompanying the Restatement, fell into the aided-by-agency portion of section 219. See id. For example, according to section 219, comment e, a telegraph operator who sends false messages is
capable of doing so only because of the position that he holds as operator. See id.
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219 cmt. e (1958)).
152

See id.

153

See id. at 2291.

154 See

id.; see also Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("A supervisor's use of the term [nigger] impacts the work environment

far more severely than use by co-equals.").
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serves as an appropriate starting point for determining
the propriety
55
of employer liability for supervisory indiscretion.1
The Court, however, stressed the need to square its holding with
Meritoas admonition that employer liability for supervisory sexual
harassment is not to be automatic. 15' The Court proposed two solutions to ensure some employer protection: a requirement of proof of
the supervisor's affirmative invocation of authority, or recognition of
an employer's affirmative defense in some circumstances.'57
The majority swiftly rejected the first option, despite the existence of both scholarly and judicial approval of this approach. 5 Justice Souter recognized that affirmative invocation of authority is a
rare event and noted that, from a victim's perspective, the supervisor's authority is always present - expressly advertised or not.' 59 The
Justice warned that subjective judicial attempts to discern the line between implicit and explicit invocation of authority would lead to increased litigation and contradictory
results.'6 As such, the Court re6
jected this "active use" approach.' '
The majority preferred the second option for avoiding automatic liability: An employer may be vicariously liable for supervisory
sexual harassment, but an affirmative defense would allow the employer to demonstrate that reasonable care had been exercised to
162
avoid harassment both before and after its occurrence.. The Court
articulated its reasoning that an employer may likewise escape liability if the employer can demonstrate that the employee failed to make
reasonable efforts to take advantage of existing safeguard procedures.' 6 The Court stated that proof of the first element is not necessary in every case as a matter of law, but may be addressed appropriately in litigation."" The Court added that proof of the second
155 See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2290-91 (quoting
Estrich, supra note 2, at 854 (1991)
(asserting that a supervisor's power to hire and fire "'does not disappear... when
he chooses to harass through insults and offensive gestures rather than directly with
threats of firing or promises of promotion"')).
)
See id. at 2291; see also supra note 80 (discussing the reasoning
behind Merito's
rejection of automatic liability).
57 See Faragher,118S. Ct. at2291.
'58
See id. at 2291-92.
15
See id ("Supervisors do not make speeches threatening sanctions whenever
they make requests in the legitimate exercise of managerial authority, and yet every
subordinate employee knows the sanctions exist .....
160 See id. at 2292.

161 See id.
162
63

i4

See id.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
See id. at 2293.
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element, the employee's failure to take reasonable care in reporting
the harassment, is likely to satisfy an employer's burden of proof under the defense.'6 Noting that Title VII's primary purpose is not to
provide redress, but rather to avoid harm, the Court attested to the
appropriateness of the defense in this statutory context." This defense, the Court elucidated, comports with the statutory notion that
the employer should not provide safeguards against sexual harassment as an option, but rather as an obligation.' 67 The Court found
that this defense would give employers added incentive to minimize
the probability of sexual harassment in the workplace while protecting employers who have taken meaningful action.'6 Furthermore,
the Court indicated that requiring a victim to take reasonable advantage of existing safeguard mechanisms comports logically with general damage theory such that a plaintiff will not be rewarded for
damage that reasonably could have been avoided or mitigated.'6
Finally, applying the facts of Faragherto its newly articulated
standard, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,
which had found that the City could not be held vicariously liable for
supervisory hostile environment harassment. " ° The Court reiterated
that an actionable hostile environment was caused by Faragher's direct supervisors, Silverman and Terry. "' In light of Justice Souter's
analysis, the Court concluded that the City was vicariously liable for
the sexual harassment and could not assert an affirmative defense
because it failed to exercise reasonable, preventative care, its antiharassment policy was improperly disseminated, the supervisory behavior went unchecked, and the lifeguards had no general grievance
See id.
See id. at 2292. Since 1980, the EEOC has urged employers to avoid sexual
harassment in the workplace by informing employees of their rights. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(0 (1998). In 1990, the Commission urged employers to provide their
workers with practical complaint mechanisms. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 8 FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT PRACI CES MANUAL
405:6699 (Mar. 19, 1990).
167 SeeFaragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
G8 See
id.
16
See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n,
458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982) (reiterating that a victim has a duty to mitigate
harm)). The Court explained, "If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability
should be found against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could reasonably have been mitigated no award against a liable employer
should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have avoided." Faragher,118
16
16

S. Ct. at 2292.

See id. at 2293; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing
the
reasoning for the circuit court's decision).
171
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2293.
170
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mechanism from which to benefit.'7 The Court 73remanded the case
for reinstatement of the district court's judgment.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented,'174 directing
the reader's attention to the dissent in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth 7 ' Faragher'ssister case.' 76 Justice Thomas disagreed with the
majority and insisted that negligence standards, rather than agency
principles, should determine employer liability in cases of supervisory
hostile environment sexual harassment. 177 The dissent focused on
precedent from the courts of appeals that established a negligence
standard for determining employer liability in the context of racial
harassment. 17 Justice Thomas opined that claims of sexual harass172

See id.

173

See id. at 2294.

See id. (ThomasJ, dissenting).
118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Kimberly Ellerth quit
her job as a salesperson for Burlington Industries after 15 months, alleging that an
indirect supervisor, Ted Slowik, had sexually harassed her. See id. at 2262. Ellerth
suffered no tangible job detriment as a result of the alleged harassment, and she
claimed to have rejected Slowik's numerous advances. See id. As a matter of fact,
Ellerth was actually promoted during the period in question. See id. Ellerth failed to
take advantage of existing complaint mechanisms despite the company's implementation of a sexual harassment policy. See id.
Ellerth filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Burlington Industries, in violation of Title VII, engaged in sexual harassment that resulted in Ellerth's constructive discharge. See id. at 2263. The district
court acknowledged that Slowik's actions were severe or pervasive enough to create
an actionable hostile environment; however, the case was dismissed under principles
of negligence. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1114, 1123
(N.D. Ill. 1996). The district court found that Burlington Industries did not know or
have reason to know of the harassment, and, therefore, could not be held liable. See
id. at 1123.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. SeeJansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997). Eight separate
opinions, void of consensus, were issued with the decision, and the United States
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to define the standards of employer
liability with respect to supervisory hostile environment sexual harassment. See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2264. The Court's ultimate holding in Burlington Industries is identical to that in Faragher. See id. at 2270. The Court held Burlington Industries liable for the harassment, and remanded the case to give Burlington Industries
an opportunity to take advantage of the newly constructed affirmative defense. See
id. at 2271.
06 SeeFaragher,118 S. Ct. at 2294
(ThomasJ., dissenting).
177 See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2271 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
178 See id. at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas first recounted the
174
175

origin of the "hostile environment" category of sexual harassment, as it was developed in Rogers. See id. at 2271-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Rogers v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)); see also supra
notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing Rogers). The Justice then seized
upon the judicially accepted negligence standard for determining employer liability
in Title VII cases. See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
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ment should be treated no differently." The Justice declared that if
supervisory hostile environment sexual harassment falls outside the
scope of supervisory employment, as the majority conceded, a negligence standard for employer liability is mandatory.' 0 If the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment and breached a duty
to prevent or stop the offensive behavior, the dissent reasoned, then
liability is appropriate.'" Absent such knowledge or duty, added the
dissent, the imposition of vicarious liability essentially serves to punish those who are not at fault."" Justice Thomas warned of dire consequences that will flow from the Court's decision, namely "Big
Brother"-type'ss surveillance in the workplace instituted to monitor
and prevent all sexual harassment, an impossible and intrusive task.' 84
A negligence-based "reasonableness" standard, the dissent suggested,
would be more appropriate."
Justice Thomas also criticized the affirmative defense proposed
by the majority as lacking clarity and direction.186 The Justice lamented that the majority's failure to provide meaningful instruction
regarding this defense will only add to the already muddled body of
sexual harassment jurisprudence. 8 7 The dissent suggested that the
defense fails realistically to ensure that Meritor's rejection of automatic liability remains viable.'" Since an employer may still be liable
even after demonstrating a plaintiffs failure to take advantage of ex-

(citing Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that,
absent tangible job detriment, the standard for determining employer liability for
supervisory racial harassment is negligence); Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858
F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988) (same)).
17 See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2272-73
(ThomasJ., dissenting).
180 See id. at 2272-73 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
182

See id
See id. at 2275 (ThomasJ., dissenting).

183

In 1984, George Orwell's masterpiece vision of negative utopia, "Big Brother"

181

was a synonym for the ominous, tyrannical, manipulative government.

GEORGE

1984 5 (1949). Throughout the novel, the narrator is constantly reminded
that "Big Brother is Watching .. " See id.
184 See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2273 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Sexual harassment is simply not something that employers can wholly prevent without taking
extraordinary measures.- constant video and audio surveillance, for example ORWELL,

that would revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible with a free society.").
185 See id.
186

See id.

See id. Justice Thomas forecasted "a continuing reign of confusion in
this important area of the law." Id.
198 See id. at 2274 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
187
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isting complaint procedures, concluded the dissent, the rule is still
essentially one of automatic liability.'
Finally, Justice Thomas found the majority's reading of section
219(2) (d) of the Restatement of Agency to be baseless. 90 The dissent
argued that section 219(2) (d) imputes liability only when the plaintiff believes that the agent acted in the ordinary course of business or
within the scope of employment.'
The majority's imposition of liability based upon the agent's power, authority, or menacing nature,
chided the Justice, is simply a policy decision without support from
statute or precedent.1 2 The Justice urged that all Title VII actions
should be treated equally such that there are no extensions of employer liability for hostile environment harassment,
on the basis of
93
sex or otherwise, absent proof of negligence.
With Faragher,the Court demonstrated an increased, admirable
sensitivity toward alleged victims of sexual harassment. The majority's decision to hold employers vicariously liable for supervisory hostile environment sexual harassment is certain to increase awareness
and attempts at prevention. As Justice Thomas noted in dissent,
however, the point at which an employer's methods of prevention
will provide an effective shield from liability remains unclear.'9 4 Over
the past several years, there has been a marked increase in workplace
sensitivity training programs and seminars. 95 No doubt employers
who have heretofore been lax will scramble to institute strong antiharassment policies following this decision.
But what is a "policy?" When all is said and done, after the lectures have ended and sensitivity seminars have wrapped up, a "policy"
is still nothing more than a written warning hanging on the wall of a
stockroom or bathroom.
The Court acknowledges that employers
See id.
See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91 See id. Justice Thomas disagreed with the
majority's aided-by-agency analysis
and would have found liability only in cases of recklessness or negligence. See id.
192 See
id.
193 See id.
1" See id.
195 See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Cities Press Crackdown
on Sexual Harassment, MIAMI
HERALD, July 13, 1992, at 1BR (discussing attempts to prevent sexual harassment at
the workplace in several Florida cities); Chuck Philips, You've Still Got a Long Way to
Go, Baby, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at 9 (noting increased attempts at sexual harassment prevention in the music industry).
196 SeeJohn Cloud, Sex and the Law, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at
52. The author stated:
Companies have responded to the legal morass with wildly varying
policies. Some ignore the issue, and others, particularly those burned
with lawsuits, even ban interoffice dating. Nearly 9 out of 10 compa189
'90
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are in the best position to supervise, train, and screen employees, but
that is no simple task. Unlike most employment-related problems,
sexual harassment is not something that an employer is capable of
preventing through simple instruction, demonstration, lecture, or
policy-making. Initially, an employer may not be capable of detecting a potential supervisor's predilection toward harassment. Potentially dangerous stereotypical generalizations regarding sex are not
likely to manifest themselves at a job interview. Sexism and gender
objectification are the outgrowths of a lifetime of influences that give
rise to a chauvinistic attitude deeply ingrained in the psyche of the
offender - an attitude that female activists have struggled to change
for many years. Gender bias that is planted during childhood and
nurtured for years through the media is not easily reversed or contained. The Court certainly does not expect employers singlehandedly to eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace. Yet if an
employer is to have any hope of escaping liability, the employer must
take steps to develop some reasonable policy.
Critics of Faragher,Justices Thomas and Scalia among them, fear
that the uncertainty surrounding an appropriate, effective policy will
give rise to a dilution of First Amendment freedoms in the workplace
as well as a trampling of privacy rights due to employers' increased
use of extensive monitoring systems in the name of preventon.
While such a result is certainly possible, it is unlikely that employers
will not exercise reason when implementing new and more effective
preventative measures.
Rather, an unfortunate side effect of Faragher will likely be
mountains of litigation. The allegedly harassed employee, however,
will not be the sole plaintiff. While the promise of a deep pocket will
likely provide an added incentive for allegedly victimized employees
nies have procedures for dealing with sexual harassment... but many
of those procedures are weak - "a paragraph in the company handbook" ....

Id. (quoting Ellen Bravo, co-director of the National Association of Working
Women).
Another fascinating by-product of sexual harassment litigation has been the
creation of the workplace "consensual relationship agreement," whereby employees
attest to the consensual nature of their relationship in writing and agree that a
breakup will have no adverse job impact. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
197 See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
As Chief
Judge Posner stated, "It is facile to suggest that employers are quite capable of monitoring a supervisor's actions affecting the work environment. Large companies have
thousands of supervisory employees. Are they all to be put under video surveillance?
Subjected to periodic lie-detector tests? Trailed on business trips by company spies?"
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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to bring suit, it will also encourage frustrated and frightened employers to fire supervisors before the behavior in question reaches
the actionable "severe or pervasive" stage. Fear of hefty damage
awards coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the definition of a
reasonable, effective policy may prompt employers to move toward
termination absent proper investigation and reasonable remedial efforts. Even prior to the Court's decision, there had been a rise in
such "backlash" cases - actions brought by accused employees who
claim to have been prematurely and unlawfully terminated. ' " Yet
fear of a tyrannical workplace and rising backlash suits, without
more, is no reason to condemn the Faragherdecision. Obviously, just
as apprehension of suits from victims of sexual harassment may
prompt employers to develop innovative and more effective preventative mechanisms, fear of supervisors' backlash suits will likely calm
an employer's trigger finger2°0 and motivate employers to "protect the
rights of the accused as well as the accuser. 20 ' Although no one can
realistically expect employers to weed out all potential offenders and
miraculously reform those who emerge, Faragherproperly recognizes
that it is the employer who must bear the burden at this point, not
the victim.
Faragher,as both law and policy, is sound. The "aided-by-agency"
portion of section 219(2) (d) provides an appropriate, logical basis
for the Court's decision. As Justice Souter stated, a victim need not
be reminded of her supervisor's authority; in the eyes of the victimized employee, it is always present. A victim cannot logically presume
that the employer condones the actions of a supervisor who creates a
severe or pervasive hostile work environment. Nonetheless, that supervisor has been given the ability to take meaningful job action
against the victim. Such power, though not necessarily flaunted, is
always present in the mind of the victimized employee. This unspo-

198

See Anti-Expressionism, supra note 5, at 8.

"[B]ecause liability is almost auto-

matic as soon as a complaint is filed, employees who seek generous settlements have
an incentive not to complain until after the offensive conduct becomes severe and
[sic] pervasive enough to be actionable." Id.
1
See generally Kathy Barrett Carter, Harassment Law Proves Double-Edged, STAR-

LEDGER, Aug. 7, 1998, at 1.
200 In 1993, the Miller Brewing Company fired a male executive for discussing an
episode of "Seinfeld," the popular situation comedy, with a female co-worker who
took offense. See Dorothy Rabinowitz, TV 'The Seinfeld Firing,' WALL ST. J., May 11,
1998, at A20. A jury subsequently awarded the terminated executive $18.5 million
dollars in damages. See id. Cases like this might make an employer think twice before immediately firing supervisors who are accused of sexual harassment.
201 Carter, supra note 199, at 28.

1068

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

ken power fits precisely within the Restatement's aided-by-agency
language.
Perhaps the law of sexual harassment would be clarified more
adequately if it were removed from the confines of Title VII and
treated independently by Congress. To provide victims with any
hope of relief, courts have been forced to place sexual harassment
awkwardly within Title ViI's. prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex202 and have essentially been left to the task of developing jurisprudential contours for a wrong that has been ill-defined by the
legislature. Until Congress adopts a more aggressive approach toward refining the law of sexual harassment in the workplace, evenhanded and consistent justice will continue to be elusive, and the
workplace will likely remain permeated with accusation and suspicion.
Stuartj Goldstein

22

See supra note 2. Actions for same-sex sexual harassment have brought to light

the somewhat fictional nature of the characterization of sexual harassment as harassment "on the basis of sex" for Title VII purposes. See Gabriel A. Terrasa, Fitting a
Square Peg into a Round Hole: "Same Sex" Sexual Harassment and the "Because of... Sex"
Requirement in Hostile Environment Claims, 67 REViSTAJURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO
Rico 163, 183-89 (1998). If, indeed, a male supervisor sexually harasses one male
worker in an all-male workplace, it is difficult to comprehend how, if at all, the
worker is being harassed because he is male. See id. at 196 (advocating a
"[h]arassment that is sexual in nature" standard, rather than a strict "because
of... sex" standard in hostile environment sexual harassment claims).

